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IDENTITY CRISIS: VEASEY v. ABBOTT AND 
THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF TEXAS 
VOTER ID LAW SB 14 
MARY KATE SEXTON* 
Abstract: In July 2016, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
reheard en banc its own three-judge panel decision ruling that Texas Senate Bill 
14 (SB 14), a law requiring individuals to present a form of photo identification 
in order to vote, was unconstitutional in violation of the First and Fifteenth 
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. 
The en banc Fifth Circuit reversed the District Court for the Southern District of 
Texas’s decision that SB 14 violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The en 
banc Fifth Circuit affirmed, however, the district court’s ruling that SB 14 violat-
ed the Voting Rights Act because of its discriminatory effect, and remanded that 
issue to the district court to determine an appropriate remedy prior to the 2016 
general election. The dissenting opinion argued that the majority relied on im-
proper evidence to support its determination that SB 14 had a discriminatory ef-
fect on certain Texas voters. This comment argues that the en banc Fifth Circuit 
properly determined that SB 14 could have been enacted with a discriminatory 
purpose, and in fact did have discriminatory effects that unconstitutionally inter-
fered with low-income minorities’ participation in the political process. 
INTRODUCTION 
On November 5, 2013, Floyd James Carrier of China, Texas went to his 
local polling place to exercise his constitutional right to vote.1 After he arrived 
at the polling place, Mr. Carrier, a retired, wheelchair bound, African American 
Army veteran, was denied the right to vote because he lacked the proper photo 
identification required by Texas Senate Bill 14 (“SB 14”).2 Specifically, Mr. 
                                                                                                                           
 * Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE JOURNAL OF LAW & SOCIAL JUSTICE, 2016–2017. 
 1 Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint at 5, 7, Veasey v. Perry (Veasey I), 71 F. Supp. 3d 627 
(S.D. Tex. 2014) (No. 2:13-cv-00193 (NGR)) [hereinafter Second Amended Complaint]. The Fifteenth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states that the right of citizens of the United States to vote shall 
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous 
condition of servitude. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. 
 2 Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 5, 7. The Texas Election Code, in the section titled 
Documentation of Proof of Identification, states: 
The following documentation is an acceptable form of photo identification under this 
chapter: (1) a driver’s license, election identification certificate, or personal identifica-
tion card issued to the person by the Department of Public Safety that has not expired or 
that expired no earlier than 60 days before the date of presentation; (2) a United States 
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Carrier was turned away at the polls because his veteran identification card did 
not contain a photograph, and he was thus unable to participate in the election 
being held that day.3 To qualify for a disability exemption from the photo identi-
fication (“photo ID”) requirement under SB 14, Mr. Carrier would have needed 
to obtain a voter registration certificate explaining his disability.4 This process 
would have required him to obtain written documentation of his disability from 
the United States Social Security Administration or the Department of Veter-
an’s Affairs.5 
Situations like Mr. Carrier’s became common in Texas after the state leg-
islature passed SB 14 in 2011, which dramatically changed the rules regarding 
the types of identification that one must present to exercise the right to vote.6 
Prior to the passage of SB 14, a voter could cast a ballot in person by present-
ing a voter registration certificate or by signing an affidavit and presenting one 
of several forms of identification.7 Following the passage of SB 14, however, 
utility bills, old paychecks, expired driver’s licenses, or other “unofficial” doc-
umentation, which had previously been acceptable forms of identification at 
polling places, were deemed unacceptable forms of identification.8 Voters now 
needed to adhere to much stricter rules and provide documentation which was 
often costly and time-consuming to acquire.9 
Texas began enforcing SB 14 on June 25, 2013.10 Plaintiffs filed suit 
against the state of Texas the next day, claiming that SB 14 was adopted with 
discriminatory intent and would have a discriminatory effect on African-
American and Hispanic voters, who, as a group, are more likely to lack ac-
ceptable photo identification under SB 14.11 The State of Texas in defense ar-
                                                                                                                           
military identification card that contains the person’s photograph that has not expired or 
that expired no earlier than 60 days before the date of presentation; (3) a United States 
citizenship certificate issued to the person that contains the person’s photograph; (4) a 
United States passport issued to the person that has not expired or that expired no earli-
er than 60 days before the date of presentation; or (5) a license to carry a handgun is-
sued to the person by the Department of Public Safety that has not expired or that ex-
pired no earlier than 60 days before the date of presentation. 
TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 63.0101 (West 2016). 
 3 Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 7. 
 4 Veasey v. Abbott (Veasey III), 830 F.3d 216, 226 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc). 
 5 See id. 
 6 See Plaintiff’s Original Complaint at 2–3, Veasey I, 71 F. Supp. 627 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (No 2:13-
cv-00193) [hereinafter Original Complaint]. 
 7 Veasey III, 830 F.3d at 226. 
 8 See id.; Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 13–15. 
 9 See Veasey III, 830 F.3d at 226; Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 13–15. 
 10 Veasey v. Abbott (Veasey II), 796 F.3d 487, 495 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 
vacated in part en banc, 830 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2016). 
 11 See Veasey I, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627, 633 (S.D. Tex. 2014), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, vacated in 
part, 796 F.3d 487 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, vacated in part en banc, 830 F.3d 216 
(5th Cir. 2016); Brief of Amici Curiae the Am. Civil Liberties Union & the Am. Civil Liberties Union 
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gued that SB 14 did not deny or abridge the right to vote in any way, nor did it 
result in a denial or abridgement of the right to vote on account of race.12 The 
defendants claimed that while there may be a burden associated with obtaining 
a valid photo ID, the choice to not bear this burden was not sufficient to estab-
lish the presence of a denial or abridgement of the right to vote.13 After a nine 
day bench trial, the district court held that SB 14 created an unconstitutional 
burden on the right to vote, was passed with a discriminatory purpose, and dis-
criminated against Hispanic and African American voters.14 Subsequently, be-
fore the November 2014 general elections, the district court issued a perma-
nent and final injunction against the enforcement of the voter identification 
provisions of SB 14 and ordered the state to return to enforcing the ID re-
quirements that were in effect prior to the passage of the legislation.15 The 
State appealed the district court’s decision in October 2014, and a panel of 
Fifth Circuit judges granted the State’s emergency motion for stay pending 
appeal.16 Plaintiffs then filed emergency motions before the Supreme Court 
seeking to vacate the Fifth Circuit’s stay, which the Supreme Court denied.17 
The Fifth Circuit panel’s stay of the district court’s injunction remained in ef-
fect and the photo ID requirements of SB 14 continued to be enforced.18 
The Fifth Circuit’s panel opinion regarding the State’s appeal from the 
district court’s judgment held that the district court committed legal errors in 
concluding that SB 14 was enacted with a discriminatory purpose, and vacated 
and remanded that portion of the district court’s opinion for further proceed-
ings.19 Nonetheless, the panel affirmed the district court’s determination that 
SB 14 had a discriminatory effect, and rendered judgment in favor of the state 
on that issue.20 After the Fifth Circuit panel’s opinion, the Supreme Court de-
nied a motion by the parties to vacate the stay of the district court’s injunction 
but, in an attempt to encourage the resolution of the legal issues surrounding 
SB 14 prior to the November 2016 presidential election, the Supreme Court 
instructed the full Fifth Circuit to decide the case by July 20, 2016.21 Subse-
quently, on July 20, 2016, in Veasey v. Abbott, the en banc Fifth Circuit reex-
amined the district court’s decision and concluded that SB 14 should be reex-
                                                                                                                           
of Tex. in Support of Appellees in Support of Affirmance, Veasey II, 796 F.3d 487 (5th Cir. 2015) 
(No. 14-41127). 
 12 See Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 18, 21, Veasey I, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627 (S.D. Tex. 2014) 
(No. 2:13-cv-00193). 
 13 See id. at 21. 
 14 Veasey III, 830 F.3d at 228; Veasey I, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 698–99. 
 15 Veasey I, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 707. 
 16 Veasey III, 830 F.3d at 228. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 See Veasey II, 796 F.3d 487, 503–04 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 20 Id. at 513, 520. 
 21 Id. at 229. 
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amined for the possibility that the state legislature passed SB 14 with a dis-
criminatory purpose, and further determined that SB 14 violated Section 2 of 
the Voting Rights Act because of its discriminatory effect on certain groups of 
Texas voters.22 The court determined that beneath the seemingly legitimate 
motives of preventing voter fraud and protecting the political process, circum-
stantial evidence indicated that the legislation was racially motivated, prevent-
ed poor minority groups from exercising their right to vote, and sought to mar-
ginalize minority groups from the political process as a whole.23 
Part I of this comment outlines the factual and procedural history of Ve-
asey III. Part II of this comment discusses the court’s determination that SB 14 
was enacted with a discriminatory purpose and subsequently resulted in a dis-
criminatory effect on minority voters. Part III advocates for the Fifth Circuit’s 
legal interpretation and determination that SB 14 was discriminatory, and high-
lights the adverse impact that legislation like SB 14 has on low-income minori-
ty citizens attempting to participate in the political process. Low-income, mi-
nority citizens are statistically more likely to lack identification that complies 
with SB 14, and thus are more likely to be denied the right to vote than their 
wealthier white counterparts. 
I. THE FIGHT TO THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
Prior to the passage of SB 14 on May 16, 2011, Texas voters could vote in 
person by presenting a registration certificate, a form of identification that was 
mailed to one’s residence upon registering to vote.24 If voters did not present the 
certificate at the time that they attempted to cast their vote, they could instead 
sign an affidavit and present one of a multitude of possible forms of identifica-
tion including a driver’s license, utility bill, paycheck, or another document con-
taining their name and address.25 When the state of Texas enacted SB 14 in 
2011, it drastically altered the types of identification that voters could use to sat-
isfactorily verify their identity to participate in elections.26 Once enacted, SB 14 
required that voters present a Texas driver’s license, an identification card issued 
by the Department of Public Safety, a military identification card, a citizenship 
certificate with a photograph, a United States passport, a concealed carry permit, 
or an Election Identification Certificate (“EIC”).27 All of these forms of identifi-
cation needed to be either valid or not expired by more than 60 days.28 
                                                                                                                           
 22 See Veasey III, 830 F.3d at 226, 264, 272. 
 23 See id. at 264. 
 24 Veasey v. Abbott (Veasey III), 830 F.3d 216, 225 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc). 
 25 Id. 
 26 See id. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. Although the Department of Public Safety was not permitted to charge a fee for an EIC or a 
duplicate, the Department did require that in order to obtain an EIC a voter must present either one 
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To obtain these documents, some potential voters would have to travel to 
various government offices, sometimes out of state if the voter was not origi-
nally from Texas and the documents were still held in another state, and they 
would have to pay fees for certified or duplicate copies.29 Thus, those without 
access to transportation to obtain the proper identifying documents, or those 
without the funds to pay for certified or duplicate copies of their IDs, would be 
unable to obtain appropriate identification in compliance with SB 14, and thus 
would be unable to vote in Texas elections.30 Due to differences in average 
income levels, minority citizens are more likely than white citizens to lack ac-
ceptable SB 14 identification, and SB 14 thus disproportionately burdens their 
ability to vote.31 
On June 26, 2013, almost immediately after SB 14 went into effect, op-
ponents of SB 14 filed suit to enjoin the state of Texas from enforcing the law, 
and the opponents consolidated their claims into one case in the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of Texas.32 The plaintiffs primarily 
claimed that the identification requirements contained within the law violated 
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act because it was motivated by a racially dis-
criminatory purpose and had a racially discriminatory effect.33 Section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act serves to ensure that no voter is denied participation in elec-
                                                                                                                           
form of primary ID, two forms of secondary ID, or one form of secondary ID coupled with two other 
forms of identification supporting their application. See id. at 225–26. Therefore, an application for an 
EIC would require voters to obtain an original or certified copy of their birth certificate, an original or 
certified copy of a State Department certification of birth, naturalization papers, or an original or certi-
fied copy of a court order containing the voter’s identifying information. See id. at 226. 
 29 See id. at 225–26; Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 14–15. 
 30 See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 12–15; Original Complaint, supra note 6, at 
2, 6–8. 
 31 Veasey III, 830 F.3d at 250. 
 32 See id. at 227. 
 33 See Original Complaint, supra note 6, at 10. The Voting Rights Act reads: 
No person acting under color of law shall—(A) in determining whether any individual 
is qualified under State law or laws to vote in any election, apply any standard, practice, 
or procedure different from the standards, practices, or procedures applied under such 
law or laws to other individuals within the same county, parish, or similar political sub-
division who have been found by State officials to be qualified to vote; (B) deny the 
right of any individual to vote in any election because of an error or omission on any 
record or paper relating to any application, registration, or other act requisite to voting, 
if such error or omission is not material in determining whether such individual is quali-
fied under State law to vote in such election . . . . 
The Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445 (codified at 52 U.S.C. § 10101(2) 
(2012)). Additionally, The Voting Rights Act, enacted in 1965, was born directly out of the need to 
protect African-Americans from facing unconstitutional burdens on their right to vote, including being 
subjected to literacy tests, being required to pay poll taxes, having their voting power diluted, and 
being subjected to threats or intimidation when attempting to cast a ballot at the polls. See South Caro-
lina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 812 (1966); Willing v. Lake Orion Bd. of Trustees, 924 F. Supp. 
815, 820 (E.D. Mich. 1996). 
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tions because of his or her race, and the plaintiffs argued that SB 14 violated 
Section 2 because it resulted in the denial of the right to vote for low-income 
minorities who were unable to obtain acceptable identification.34 The plaintiffs 
further asserted that their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated 
because the photo ID requirement placed a substantial burden on their right to 
vote.35 The state of Texas defended the bill on the grounds that it passed SB 14 
with the legitimate goal of preventing voter fraud, which would in turn pro-
duce more faith in the political system and higher voter turnout.36 
Following a nine-day bench trial, the district court determined in Veasey I 
that SB 14 created a burden on the right to vote in violation of the Constitution, 
resulted in a discriminatory effect on African American and Hispanic citizens, 
and was passed with a discriminatory purpose.37 Due to the approaching No-
vember 2014 general elections, the court issued an injunction against the en-
forcement of the sections of SB 14 requiring photo IDs.38 The state appealed the 
district court’s decision and a panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals granted 
the state’s emergency motion for stay pending appeal in October 2014.39 With 
the November 2014 elections fast approaching, the plaintiffs sought to have the 
court’s stay vacated by the United States Supreme Court, but the court ultimately 
denied the motions.40 Texas continued enforcing SB 14 because the Fifth Circuit 
granted the state’s emergency motions for stay pending appeal.41 
On appeal, on August 5, 2015, a Fifth Circuit panel concluded in Veasey 
II that the district court committed legal errors in analyzing whether SB 14 was 
passed with a discriminatory purpose, and thus vacated the district court’s de-
termination that the law was passed with discriminatory intent.42 Additionally, 
the Fifth Circuit panel affirmed the district court’s determination that SB 14 
had a discriminatory effect in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.43 
                                                                                                                           
 34 See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 27. The plaintiffs also asserted that their First 
and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated because the photo ID requirement placed a substan-
tial burden on their right to vote. Id. 
 35 Veasey III, 830 F.3d at 227; Original Complaint, supra note 6, at 10–11. 
 36 Veasey v. Perry (Veasey I), 71 F. Supp. 3d 627, 641 (S.D. Tex. 2014) ), aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part, vacated in part, 796 F.3d 487 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, vacated in part en 
banc, 830 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2016). 
 37 Id. at 633. 
 38 Veasey III, 830 F.3d at 228; Veasey I, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 707. 
 39 Veasey v. Abbott (Veasey II), 796 F.3d 487, 495, 496 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part, vacated in part en banc, 830 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2016). 
 40 Veasey III, 830 F.3d at 228. 
 41 See id. 
 42 See Veasey II, 796 F.3d at 487, 503–04. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court re-
lied on infirm evidence in its determination that SB 14 was passed with a discriminatory purpose, 
including relying too heavily on the history of past discrimination, choosing ineffective examples of 
current statewide discrimination, relying too heavily on post-enactment speculation by the legisla-
tion’s opponents, and relying on procedural departures in passing SB 14. Id. at 499–502. 
 43 See id. at 513. 
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The Fifth Circuit remanded this issue back to the district court so that the court 
could determine a remedy in light of the Fifth Circuit’s findings.44 
The Fifth Circuit subsequently granted the plaintiff’s motion for rehearing 
en banc, and reviewed the district court’s judgment.45 The full Fifth Circuit in 
Veasey III examined the district court’s determination that SB 14 was passed 
with a discriminatory purpose, the law’s possible discriminatory effect, and SB 
14’s creation of unconstitutional burdens on the right to vote in violation of the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments.46 The court reversed and remanded the dis-
trict court’s determination that SB 14 was enacted with a discriminatory pur-
pose because the court believed that the district court relied on insufficient evi-
dence, such as statements by the legislation’s opponents and the legislative 
history, in concluding that SB 14 was passed with unconstitutionally discrimi-
natory motivations.47 The court also concluded that the district court did not 
clearly err in determining that the enactment of SB 14 had a discriminatory 
effect because the law specifically burdened low-income voters, and dispropor-
tionate numbers of low income Texans were members of minority groups.48 The 
Fifth Circuit then remanded the issue to the district court for a proper reme-
dy.49 
II. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION ON DISCRIMINATORY  
PURPOSE AND EFFECT 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, affirmed its three-judge 
panel’s decision reviewing the district court’s ruling on the plaintiff’s discrimina-
                                                                                                                           
 44 See id. 
 45 Veasey III, 830 F.3d at 225. An en banc rehearing of a case occurs “with all judges present and 
participating; in full court.” En banc, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 46 Veasey III, 830 F.3d at 229, 243, 245. 
 47 See id. at 241–42. A law has a discriminatory purpose in violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if, given both direct and circumstantial evidence, challengers 
are able to establish that discrimination was a substantial or motivating factor in the passage of the 
law. Id. at 230–31. To determine if discrimination was a substantial or motivating factor in the pas-
sage of the law, courts look to the historical background of the legislation, the specific sequence of 
events preceding the passage of the legislation, departures from normal procedural sequences, and 
legal history including contemporary statements of the decision-making body. Id. 
 48 See id. at 252, 256. A law violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act if it has a discriminatory 
effect. Id. at 244. There is a two-part analysis employed in a court’s determination of whether a law 
has a discriminatory effect. Id. First, “plaintiffs must show not only that the challenged law imposes a 
burden on minorities, but also that ‘a certain electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social 
and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters 
to elect their preferred representatives.’” Id. at 243–44 (quoting Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 
(1986)). In addition to pure statistical analysis, courts also employ the Gingles factors to determine the 
second prong of the two-part analysis: whether current or historical condition of discrimination impact 
minorities in violation of Section 2. Veasey III, 830 F.3d at 244. 
 49 Id. at 265. 
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tory purpose and effect claims.50 The Fifth Circuit ruled that plaintiffs did not 
prove that SB 14 was passed with a discriminatory purpose, but that the legisla-
tion did have a discriminatory effect.51 The majority opinion, written by Judge 
Haynes and joined in full by six other member of the Fifth Circuit, reversed and 
remanded for further evaluation the issue of whether there was a discriminatory 
purpose behind SB 14 that was in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights 
Act.52 In addition, the opinion affirmed the finding by both the district court and 
the Fifth Circuit panel that SB 14 violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act 
because the law had a discriminatory effect on certain Texas voters.53 The dis-
sent, in contrast, argued that the plaintiffs were unable to prove that SB 14 was 
passed with a discriminatory purpose because it applied to all Texas voters re-
gardless of race, and that there was no evidence that SB 14 was the cause of the 
racial disparity in acceptable identification ownership.54 
A. SB 14 Could Have Been Enacted for a Discriminatory Purpose 
Judge Haynes, writing for the majority, first considered the plaintiffs’ 
claim that SB 14 was passed with a discriminatory purpose.55 Specifically, the 
plaintiffs alleged that the legislation was intended to burden only certain mi-
nority groups’ right to vote in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.56 
To successfully demonstrate that a particular law is in violation of Section 2 of 
the Voting Rights Act, plaintiffs must show that discrimination was a “substan-
tial” or “motivating” factor behind the enactment of the law.57 This does not 
necessarily mean that a law was passed for the sole purpose of discriminating 
against certain groups; it is sufficient that a law is motivated even in part by a 
discriminatory agenda.58 
To determine if the plaintiffs sufficiently proved their Section 2 violation 
claims, the court applied the framework that the United States Supreme Court 
articulated in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Develop-
ment Corp.59 In Arlington Heights, the Supreme Court outlined five non-
comprehensive factors to determine if a legislature passed a law with a dis-
criminatory purpose, and articulated that courts must perform a “sensitive in-
quiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be availa-
                                                                                                                           
 50 Veasey v. Abbott (Veasey III), 830 F.3d 216, 241–42, 265 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc), aff’g in 
part, rev’g in part, vacating in part 796 F.3d 487 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. at 224–25, 241–42. 
 53 Id. at 272. 
 54 Id. at 312, 317–18. 
 55 See id. at 224–25, 229. 
 56 Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 26. 
 57 Veasey III, 830 F.3d at 231. 
 58 See id. at 230. 
 59 Id. at 230–31. 
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ble.”60 Under the Arlington Heights framework, the challengers bear the bur-
den of demonstrating that racial discrimination was a substantial or motivating 
factor behind the enactment of the law.61 
Applying Arlington Heights, a majority of the en banc Fifth Circuit de-
termined that the district court erred in its finding that the state legislature 
passed SB 14 with a discriminatory purpose because it relied on insufficient 
evidence.62 The majority concluded that the district court relied too heavily on 
evidence of state-sponsored discriminatory voting practices from hundreds of 
years ago, analyzed weak examples of more contemporary discriminatory 
practices, and improperly relied on post-enactment speculation by opponents 
of the bill.63 In spite of these legal infirmities, the majority concluded that the 
record could support another resolution of the factual issue, and thus remanded 
the issue back to the district court to re-weigh the evidence.64 The majority 
provided the district court with guidance with which to re-weigh the evidence, 
including emphasizing that circumstantial evidence can be used to prove a dis-
criminatory purpose.65 The court also reinforced that although the state assert-
ed that the law was passed solely to prevent voter fraud and bolster confidence 
in the voting system, this seemingly legitimate purpose could not be used to 
mask discriminatory intent.66 The majority acknowledged the time constraints 
of the upcoming November 2016 election, and called on the district court to 
provide interim relief until the legislature could provide a more permanent so-
lution for the discriminatory aspects of SB 14.67 
B. SB 14 Had a Discriminatory Effect 
The plaintiffs asserted not only that SB 14 was passed with a discrimina-
tory purpose, but also that the legislation had a discriminatory effect on certain 
groups of the low-income, minority voters in Texas, particularly African Amer-
icans and Hispanics.68 Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act prohibits any “voting 
qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure . . . 
which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen . . . to vote 
                                                                                                                           
 60 Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265–68 (1977). These 
non-exhaustive five factors to analyze include: “the historical background of the decision,” “the spe-
cific sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision,” “[d]epartures from the normal proce-
dural sequence,” “[s]ubstantive departures,” and legislative history, “especially where there are con-
temporary statements by members of the decisionmaking body.” Id. at 267–68. 
 61 See id. at 270–271. 
 62 Veasey III, 830 F.3d at 230, 234. 
 63 Id. at 231–34. 
 64 Id. at 234–35, 241–42. 
 65 Id. at 241–42. 
 66 See id. at 235–36. 
 67 Id. at 242–43. 
 68 See id. at 243. 
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on account of race or color.”69 Congress has clarified that plaintiffs can prove a 
Section 2 violation by demonstrating the discriminatory effect of the law or 
policy at issue.70 
The court applied a two-part framework to determine whether SB 14 had 
a discriminatory effect on particular groups.71 To prove that a law has a dis-
criminatory effect, plaintiffs must demonstrate that: (1) the challenged law im-
poses a burden on minorities, and (2) that the electoral law, practice, or struc-
ture causes an inequality in the opportunity to participate in elections between 
groups of voters.72 As for the first factor, the majority first assessed if the law 
created a burden on minorities’ right to vote.73 The court analyzed statistical 
data to conclude that black and Hispanic voters were much more likely than 
white voters to lack proper SB 14 ID and that to obtain proper IDs required 
time, money, and extensive documentation.74 
As for the second factor, the majority used the test set forth in Thornburg 
v. Gingles to analyze whether SB 14 was the cause of alleged discrimination.75 
Applying Gingles to determine whether SB 14 caused the burden on minority 
groups’ right to vote, the court considered the history of official discrimination 
in Texas, racially polarized voting, effects of past discrimination, racial appeals 
in political campaigns, the existence of minority public officials and respon-
siveness to minority needs, and the tenuousness of policies underlying SB 
14.76 The majority further analyzed state-sponsored discriminatory actions by 
the Texas legislature as recently as 2011, disparities in minorities’ education, 
employment, and housing compared to white citizens, the lack of proportional 
minority political representation in elected bodies, and the lack of correlation 
between the state’s stated purpose of SB 14 and the achievability of the result 
the legislature sought.77 For example, the court emphasized that Texas had 
previously been found to have violated the Voting Rights Act in its past redis-
tricting plans, and that, in other litigation, Texas had conceded that racially 
polarized voting existed in 252 of its 254 counties.78 Additionally, the court 
indicated that minority voters in Texas were more likely than white citizens to 
be unemployed, live below the poverty line, and not graduate from high 
                                                                                                                           
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. at 244. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. at 254. 
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school.79 To the court, these as well as the rest of the Gingles factors demon-
strated that minority voters in Texas bore the majority of the burden of state-
sponsored discriminatory voting practices.80 The court analyzed the totality of 
these circumstances and determined that, coupled with Texas’ past and present 
problems with race and the political process as demonstrated by the Gingles 
factors, the law placed an unfair burden on minorities’ right to vote, and that 
SB 14 caused this burden.81 Thus, the court concluded that SB 14 had a dis-
criminatory effect in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, and re-
manded the issue to the district court to consider a proper remedy.82 
C. The Dissent’s Belief in the State’s Legitimate Purpose 
Judge Edith H. Jones, in a dissenting opinion joined by four other mem-
bers of the court, took the position that requiring Texas voters to verify their 
identity at the polling place by way of proper photo identification was not dis-
criminatory in purpose or effect, and served the legitimate state interest of pre-
venting voter fraud in elections.83 Judge Jones concluded that the law was neu-
tral and generally applicable to all Texas voters.84 In regards to the plaintiffs’ 
discriminatory purpose argument, Judge Jones stated that there was no direct 
evidence that the Texas legislature passed SB 14 with the intent to discriminate 
against minority voters.85 Judge Jones emphasized that the circumstantial evi-
dence the court relied upon to evaluate whether SB 14 was passed with a dis-
criminatory purpose consisted of weak, unsupported inferences rather than 
concrete evidence that discrimination motivated the bill.86 
Judge Jones then addressed the plaintiff’s claims that SB 14 had a dis-
criminatory effect on minority voters, ultimately holding that it did not.87 
Judge Jones stated that although a racial disparity in ID possession may very 
well exist, there was no indication that SB 14 “resulted in or caused a diminu-
tion of the right to vote . . . “88 The dissent also made clear that, in its opinion, 
the majority’s decision will lead to judicial supremacy by subjecting essential-
ly every voter regulation to litigation in federal court.89 
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III. ENSURING THAT LOW INCOME MINORITY VOTERS ARE NOT  
BURDENED BY VOTER ID LEGISLATION 
According to the United States Supreme Court, “[v]oting is of the most 
fundamental significance under our constitutional structure.”90 Although the 
right to vote has long been considered of the utmost importance for its citizens, 
the United States has a long history of both state and private action that has 
denied or abridged the voting rights of certain minority groups.91 The Voting 
Rights Act attempts to ensure that those citizens who have historically faced 
challenges in exercising integral, fundamental rights are protected from unjust 
laws and practices that serve to diminish their voting capacity.92 
It is unacceptable that more than fifty years after the Voting Rights Act 
was enacted, legislatures are still attempting to create laws that not only restrict 
citizens’ fundamental right to vote, but also have a disparate impact on histori-
cally marginalized minority groups.93 In Veasey III, the en banc Fifth Circuit 
correctly held that SB 14 was potentially enacted for a discriminatory purpose, 
and indeed had a discriminatory effect on poor voters, who in turn are more 
likely to be members of minority groups.94 The state of Texas argued that the 
number of people who were actually impacted by the law in such a way that 
they would be unable to exercise their right to vote was so small that this could 
not be used as evidence of a discriminatory effect.95 
In an analysis of Texas voters as a whole, statistics demonstrate that Afri-
can American and Latino voters were respectively 1.78 and 2.42 times more 
likely than white voters in Texas to lack acceptable identification under SB 
14.96 To counter this disparity, the state presented statistics demonstrating that 
only 4.5% of all registered voters in Texas lacked the IDs that SB 14 required 
in the first place.97 However, in a state as large as Texas, 4.5% of registered 
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voters amounts to 608,470 people.98 Of these 608,470 people who lack proper 
SB 14 ID, Hispanic registered voters and Black registered voters were respec-
tively 195% and 305% more likely than their white peers to lack SB 14 ID.99 
Further, statistics show that voters earning less that $20,000 per year, who are 
disproportionately minorities, were ten times as likely to lack acceptable SB 14 
ID as compared to voters making between $100,000 and $150,000.100 These 
statistics make it difficult to claim that the law does not place a burden on low-
income minority voters.101 
Fortunately, the en banc Fifth Circuit saw through the state’s attempt to 
portray SB 14 as a legitimate effort to protect against voter fraud and encour-
age voter turnout.102 A significant portion of the state’s argument rested on the 
claim that the plaintiffs were unable to point to a specific person who was ad-
versely impacted by SB 14, yet the plaintiffs in Veasey III were a collection of 
people who were not able to exercise their right to vote on election day.103 Mr. 
Floyd James Carrier, who had put his life on the line for his country, was de-
nied the right to vote in the very country that he fought to protect.104 Mr. Carri-
er’s lack of resources and physical disability made obtaining a form of photo 
ID that would be acceptable under SB 14 particularly burdensome.105 Una-
voidably, those who suffer from these laws the most are those who cannot af-
ford to take the time—or can’t afford to pay the money—and thus cannot ob-
tain the proper documentation needed to participate in elections.106 As the sta-
tistics show, those without the ability to obtain acceptable photo IDs are dis-
proportionately members of historically marginalized minority groups who 
have already spent decades attempting to ensure that their right to vote is not 
abridged.107 
The state argued that the photo identification requirement of SB 14 was not 
unduly burdensome on poor or minority voters because it was under the impres-
sion that most people already have an acceptable form of ID.108 In Veasey III, the 
state asserted that people already have photo IDs to purchase alcohol, buy cold 
medicine, open a bank account, drive, travel, enter certain buildings, and engage 
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in many other everyday activities.109 However, many of these assertions are 
false, given that in some of these instances there is either no need to provide 
identification at all or there exists an alternative way of confirming one’s identity 
that does not involve the cost or time burden of obtaining the SB 14 identifica-
tion.110 Additionally, the state’s incorrect assumptions about photo ID possession 
demonstrate a lack of understanding of the lives of low-income people, as many 
of these citizens do not drive, travel on planes, or participate in other activities 
that would require the presentation of identification.111 This failure to appreciate 
that possessing photo IDs is in fact a burden on the disproportionally high num-
ber of low-income minorities demonstrates how devastating laws like SB 14 can 
be.112 It is not a certainty that every citizen possesses an acceptable ID under SB 
14, but it should be self-evident that every citizen be guaranteed the right to 
vote.113 The Fifth Circuit in Veasey III correctly thwarted a legislative attempt to 
deny certain citizens this fundamental right.114 
CONCLUSION 
The right to vote for the laws that govern and choose democratic leaders 
is one of the most fundamental rights that a citizen of the United States can 
exercise. The state of Texas attempted to pass SB 14 under the guise that it was 
simply a piece of legislation which would protect the integrity of the election 
system and bolster the public’s belief that individual votes matter. The Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, correctly determined that underneath 
this legitimate state interest, the law could have been enacted with a discrimi-
natory purpose and the law had a discriminatory effect by placing an unconsti-
tutional burden on the right to vote upon poor minority voters. 
 In Veasey III, the Fifth Circuit identified circumstantial evidence leading 
to the conclusion that the Texas legislature was intending to prevent poor mi-
norities from voting in elections, as well as statistical evidence that those most 
affected by SB 14 were low-income minorities. The dissent failed to delve 
deeper into the legislation itself, and accepted at face value the state’s explana-
tion that it was simply trying to protect voters. The ramifications of legislation 
like SB 14 are catastrophic for minority voters, especially poor minority vot-
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ers, as this legislation requires voters to expend a burdensome amount of time 
or money to exercise their right to vote. The thought process that everyone al-
ready needs and possesses an acceptable form of photo identification that 
would comply with SB 14 represents a privileged mindset that refuses to 
acknowledge the additional monetary and time burden that a citizen without 
such identification would have to bear to exercise a right that inherently be-
longs to them. 
